This hunt hypothesis targets adversaries utilizing RISCOsoft’s ACProtect 14.x to obfuscate malicious executables and evade signature-based detection through advanced packing techniques. A SOC team should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel because identifying these specific protection signatures early allows analysts to prioritize deep inspection of potentially benign processes that may be masking underlying threats or command-and-control activities.
rule ACProtect14xRISCOsoft
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 47 65 74 50 72 6F 63 41 64 64 72 65 73 73 00 00 00 47 65 74 4D 6F 64 75 6C 65 48 61 6E 64 6C 65 41 00 00 00 4C 6F 61 64 4C 69 62 72 61 72 79 41 00 00 00 45 78 69 74 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 00 00 00 4D 65 73 73 61 67 65 42 6F 78 41 00 90 4D 69 6E 65 49 6D 70 }
condition:
$a0
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ACProtect14xRISCOsoft detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Legitimate Deployment of RISOFT Security Suite Updates via SCCM
RISOSoft_Installer.exe) or update service often exhibits ACProtect packing signatures that mimic the rule’s detection logic.ParentProcessName is ccmsetup.exe or wuauserv.exe and the file path contains \Program Files\RISOSoft\.Scenario: Scheduled Daily Antivirus Definition Sync Task
RISOSoft_Sync.exe when executed from the specific directory \ProgramData\RISOSoft\Tasks\, limited to the execution window between 02:45 and 03:15 AM.Scenario: Admin-Initiated Patch Management via WSUS
wsusclient.exe process launches a protected installer component that triggers the YARA rule due to its packed executable structure.UserAccount is part of the “Domain Admins” or