AdysGluev010

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis targets potential file-based threats identified by the AdysGluev010 YARA signature to detect specific malware or suspicious artifacts within the environment. Proactive hunting is essential in Azure Sentinel to validate these low-severity detections against broader context and prevent missed indicators of compromise that may not trigger immediate alerts due to their lower severity rating.

YARA Rule

rule AdysGluev010
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 2E 8C 06 [2] 0E 07 33 C0 8E D8 BE [2] BF [2] FC B9 [2] 56 F3 A5 1E 07 5F }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the AdysGluev010 detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Automated Backup Execution by Veeam or Commvault

  • Context: Scheduled nightly backup jobs often spawn child processes that glue together multiple data streams or compress large archives using similar heuristics to the rule’s logic. These legitimate operations frequently trigger the YARA signature due to high I/O and temporary file creation patterns.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Add a process exclusion for Veeam.Backup.Service.exe and commvault.cmd running under the system account or specific backup service accounts (e.g., DOMAIN\svc_backup). Exclude paths containing \Program Files\Veeam Backup & Replication\ and \CommServe\.

• Scenario: Microsoft Windows Update Standalone Installer

  • Context: When WindowsUpdate.exe or the standalone installer (msiexec.exe) applies cumulative updates, it often extracts temporary glue components to merge registry keys and system files. This activity mimics the behavioral pattern detected by AdysGluev010.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion for msiexec.exe where the command line contains /I or /q, specifically when launched from the path C:\Windows\Temp\. Additionally, exclude any process tree originating from TrustedInstaller.exe.

• Scenario: Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Scanning

  • Context: Native EDR agents like CrowdStrike Falcon or SentinelOne perform deep file system scans that involve “gluing” metadata from various sources. Their scanning engines often utilize similar memory allocation patterns, causing the YARA rule to flag their internal scanning threads as suspicious.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Whitelist processes FalconSensor.exe (Crow