AHPack01FEUERRADER

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential malicious activity from the AHPack01FEUERRADER signature, which indicates the presence of a specific file-based threat or malware variant within the environment. Proactive hunting for this indicator in Azure Sentinel is essential to uncover early-stage infections that may not yet trigger high-severity alerts but could signal broader compromise vectors requiring immediate investigation.

YARA Rule

rule AHPack01FEUERRADER
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 60 68 54 [2] 00 B8 48 [2] 00 FF 10 68 B3 [2] 00 50 B8 44 [2] 00 FF 10 68 00 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the AHPack01FEUERRADER detection rule, including recommended filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Antivirus Definition Updates via Scheduled Tasks

  • Context: Enterprise Endpoint Protection suites (e.g., Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike Falcon) often run scheduled jobs to download and install new virus definition packs. These updates frequently involve unpacking compressed archives containing thousands of DLLs and executables that match the generic packing signatures detected by AHPack01FEUERRADER.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a file path exclusion for the vendor’s update directory (e.g., C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\<version>\ or C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\Falcon\). Additionally, exclude processes running under the context of the specific AV service account (e.g., NT SERVICE\MsMpSvc) during the defined maintenance window.

• Scenario: Deployment of Patched Applications via Configuration Management Tools

  • Context: During routine patching cycles, tools like Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager) or Ansible deploy application updates. The deployment agents often extract installation packages (MSI/EXE bundles) to a temporary staging folder before execution, triggering the rule due to the presence of packed installers and resource files.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude file paths associated with the deployment agent’s working directory (e.g., C:\Windows\CCM\Cache or /tmp/ansible-deploy). Implement a process exclusion for the deployment service executable (e.g., ccmsetup.exe, Ansible-Runner) to ignore alerts generated during known maintenance windows.

• Scenario: Legitimate Software Installations by Helpdesk Administrators

  • Context: IT support staff frequently install standard enterprise software (such as Zoom, Adobe Acrobat