AHTeamEPProtector03fakeBorlandDelphi6070FEUERRADER

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential adversary activity involving a fake Borland Delphi executable designed to evade endpoint protection, as indicated by the specific YARA signature AHTeamEPProtector03fakeBorlandDelphi6070FEUERRADER. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to uncover stealthy initial access or persistence mechanisms that may bypass standard security controls due to their low severity classification and reliance on file-based analysis.

YARA Rule

rule AHTeamEPProtector03fakeBorlandDelphi6070FEUERRADER
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 90 [46] 90 FF E0 53 8B D8 33 C0 A3 00 00 00 00 6A 00 E8 00 00 00 FF A3 00 00 00 00 A1 00 00 00 00 A3 00 00 00 00 33 C0 A3 00 00 00 00 33 C0 A3 00 00 00 00 E8 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the detection rule AHTeamEPProtector03fakeBorlandDelphi6070FEUERRADER, along with recommended filters and exclusions:

• Legacy ERP Reporting Service Execution

  • Scenario: The enterprise runs a legacy financial reporting module (e.g., SAP NetWeaver or Oracle EBS) that utilizes a compiled Delphi-based component for generating end-of-day PDF reports. This service executes nightly at 2:00 AM, triggering the YARA rule due to its matching signature of older Borland/Delphi binaries.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the specific process path and parent process.
    • Path: C:\Program Files\SAP\NetWeaver\ReportEngine\LegacyReport.exe
    • Parent Process: svchost.exe (running under the SAPService account) or a dedicated scheduled task named “NightlyFinancialReports”.

• Custom Internal Inventory Management Tool

  • Scenario: The warehouse operations team uses a custom-built inventory scanner application developed in-house 8 years ago using Delphi. This tool runs on thin clients and communicates with the central database, often launching background processes that match the “fake Borland” signature when scanning barcodes or syncing data during shift changes.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude based on the specific file hash (SHA-256) of the known good binary and restrict the scope to the inventory subnet.
    • File Hash: [Insert SHA-256 of InventoryScanner.exe]
    • Scope: Apply exclusion only for endpoints in the WH-OPS OU (Organizational Unit).

• Scheduled Antivirus Definition Update Job

  • Scenario: The endpoint protection suite (e.g