This rule detects the presence of a specific YARA signature associated with the AHTeamEPProtector03fakePEtite22FEUERRADER artifact, which may indicate the use of a custom or obfuscated endpoint protection mechanism or a known malware variant. Proactively hunting for this signature allows the SOC team to identify potential low-severity threats or specific tooling in the environment that might evade standard behavioral detections, ensuring comprehensive coverage against targeted or niche adversary activities.
rule AHTeamEPProtector03fakePEtite22FEUERRADER
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 90 [46] 90 FF E0 B8 00 00 00 00 68 00 00 00 00 64 FF 35 00 00 00 00 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 66 9C 60 50 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: A developer or DevOps engineer is testing a custom application or library that intentionally embeds a “fake PE header” or uses a specific packing/obfuscation technique to bypass basic static analysis or to mimic a specific file structure for testing purposes. The YARA rule likely targets the specific byte sequence or structural anomaly associated with this “fake PE” implementation.
C:\Users\<user>\Projects\, C:\src\, or C:\temp\builds\) or exclude files with specific extensions (e.g., .dll, .exe) if they are owned by known development service accounts or reside in paths designated for build artifacts.Scenario: An enterprise endpoint protection tool (such as a custom EDR agent or a specific antivirus component) creates temporary memory-mapped files or cache files that utilize a non-standard PE structure for performance or licensing verification, triggering the “fake PE” signature. This often happens during real-time scanning or when the agent updates its own configuration files.
CrowdStrike Falcon, Carbon Black, Defender, Kaspersky, Trend Micro) or exclude file paths under the vendor’s installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\, C:\Program Files\Kaspersky\).Scenario: A scheduled maintenance job or a backup agent (e.g., Veeam, Commvault, or Windows Server Backup) creates temporary shadow copy files or staging areas that may have corrupted or non-standard headers due to compression or encryption algorithms, inadvertently matching the YARA pattern for a “fake PE” structure.