ANDpakk2006DmitryAndreev

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies the presence of a specific malware signature associated with Dmitry Andreev’s ANDpakk2006 tool, which may indicate early-stage reconnaissance or benign automation activity within the environment. Proactive hunting for this indicator in Azure Sentinel is essential to distinguish legitimate internal processes from potential low-severity threats that could serve as precursors to more complex attack chains.

YARA Rule

rule ANDpakk2006DmitryAndreev
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 60 FC BE D4 00 40 00 BF 00 10 00 01 57 83 CD FF 33 C9 F9 EB 05 A4 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 72 F4 33 C0 40 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 13 C0 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 72 0E 48 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 13 C0 EB DC 83 E8 03 72 0F C1 E0 08 AC 83 F0 FF 74 4D D1 F8 8B E8 EB 09 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 13 C9 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 13 C9 75 1A 41 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 13 C9 02 DB 75 05 8A 1E 46 12 DB 73 EA 83 C1 02 81 FD 00 FB FF FF 83 D1 01 56 8D 34 2F F3 A4 5E E9 73 FF FF FF C3 }

condition:
		$a0
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ANDpakk2006DmitryAndreev YARA rule detection logic, tailored for an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via Microsoft Defender

  • Context: The nightly update job for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (or Windows Update) frequently downloads and unpacks definition packages that match the signature structure of this rule. This often occurs around 02:00 AM UTC when the MsMpEng.exe process extracts new malware signatures into the C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Definition directory.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the executable path is C:\Program Files\Microsoft Defender Antivirus\mpcmdrun.exe or MsMpEng.exe and the parent process is svchost.exe with the service name “wuauserv” (Windows Update).

• Scenario: Deployment of Office 365 ProPlus Updates via SCCM

  • Context: System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager pushes cumulative updates to Microsoft Office suites. During the installation phase, the OfficeClickToRun.exe process creates temporary unpacking artifacts in %TEMP% that trigger this rule due to similar file headers and compression methods used by the vendor.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist for processes with the command line containing “Update” or “Setup” running under the OfficeClickToRun.exe executable, specifically when the user context is SYSTEM or a known deployment account (e.g., DOMAIN\SCCM_Dev).

• Scenario: Automated Backup and Archiving via Veeam Agent

  • Context: The Veeam Agent for Windows performs incremental backups of critical document repositories. During the archiving phase, the agent compresses large