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This rule detects the banker trojan with overlaying functionality

yara LOW Yara-Rules
backdoorcommunity
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Yara-Rules →
Retrieved: 2026-05-08T11:00:00Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that the detection identifies potential banker trojan activity where an adversary is using overlaying techniques to hide malicious code execution within legitimate processes. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate early-stage compromises that could lead to data exfiltration or lateral movement.

YARA Rule

rule android_overlayer
{
	meta:
		description = "This rule detects the banker trojan with overlaying functionality"
		source =  "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/android-banker-malware-goes-social"
		author = "https://twitter.com/5h1vang"

	strings:
		$str_1 = "tel:"
		$str_2 = "lockNow" nocase
		$str_3 = "android.app.action.ADD_DEVICE_ADMIN"
		$str_4 = "Cmd_conf" nocase
		$str_5 = "Sms_conf" nocase
		$str_6 = "filter2" 

	condition:
		androguard.certificate.sha1("6994ED892E7F0019BCA74B5847C6D5113391D127") or 
		
		(androguard.permission(/android.permission.INTERNET/) and
		androguard.permission(/android.permission.READ_SMS/) and
		androguard.permission(/android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE/) and 
		all of ($str_*))
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

This rule contains 6 string patterns in its detection logic.

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules/blob/main/deprecated/Android/Android_Overlayer.yar