AntiDote10Demo12SISTeam

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis targets potential low-severity malware or suspicious artifacts identified by the AntiDote10Demo12SISTeam YARA signature within Azure Sentinel’s workload. Proactively hunting for this behavior allows the SOC team to validate false positives and uncover early-stage threats that may evade standard high-severity alerts, ensuring comprehensive coverage of emerging risks in their environment.

YARA Rule

rule AntiDote10Demo12SISTeam
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 00 00 00 00 09 01 47 65 74 43 6F 6D 6D 61 6E 64 4C 69 6E 65 41 00 DB 01 47 65 74 56 65 72 73 69 6F 6E 45 78 41 00 73 01 47 65 74 4D 6F 64 75 6C 65 46 69 6C 65 4E 61 6D 65 41 00 00 7A 03 57 61 69 74 46 6F 72 53 69 6E 67 6C 65 4F 62 6A 65 63 74 00 BF 02 52 65 73 75 6D 65 54 68 72 65 61 64 00 00 29 03 53 65 74 54 68 72 65 61 64 43 6F 6E 74 65 78 74 00 00 94 03 57 72 69 74 65 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 4D 65 6D 6F 72 79 00 00 6B 03 56 69 72 74 75 61 6C 41 6C 6C 6F 63 45 78 00 00 A6 02 52 65 61 64 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 4D 65 6D 6F 72 79 00 CA 01 47 65 74 54 68 72 65 61 64 43 6F 6E 74 65 78 74 00 00 62 00 43 72 65 61 74 65 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 41 00 00 4B 45 52 4E 45 4C 33 32 2E 64 6C 6C }

condition:
		$a0
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the AntiDote10Demo12SISTeam YARA rule detection, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune

  • Context: The System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune agent executes a scheduled task to deploy security updates. During this process, the deployment engine (ccmsetup.exe or Microsoft.IntuneManagementAgent) extracts and stages update packages that contain binary signatures matching the rule’s heuristic for “suspicious team” artifacts.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Add a path-based exclusion for the application directory: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Configuration Manager\ or C:\Program Files\Microsoft Intune Management Extension. Additionally, exclude process names ccmsetup.exe, IntuneManagementAgent.exe, and wsmantr.exe when running under the SYSTEM account.

• Scenario: Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Self-Protection Scans

  • Context: The organization’s primary EDR solution (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) performs a self-scan of its own agent binaries or updates its signature database. The YARA rule detects the EDR’s internal update mechanism as an external “team” artifact because it mimics the behavior of a legitimate deployment tool.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create a process exclusion for the specific EDR service executables (e.g., FalconSensorService.exe, MsMpEng.exe). Configure the rule to ignore alerts where the parent process is the EDR’s own updater service or when the file hash matches known good signatures of the EDR agent.

• Scenario: CI/CD Pipeline Artifact Generation

  • Context: A DevOps