The detection rule identifies potential activity from a variant of the Bergard malware family, leveraging custom DLLs to execute malicious payloads. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to detect and mitigate early-stage APT campaigns that may evade traditional detection methods.
YARA Rule
rule apt_win32_dll_bergard_pgv_pvid_variant
{
meta:
copyright = "Fidelis Cybersecurity"
reference = "http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/05/turbo-twist-two-64-bit-derusbi-strains-converge.html"
strings:
$ = "Accept:"
$ = "User-Agent: %s"
$ = "Host: %s:%d"
$ = "Cache-Control: no-cache"
$ = "Connection: Keep-Alive"
$ = "Cookie: pgv_pvid="
$ = "Content-Type: application/x-octet-stream"
$ = "User-Agent: %s"
$ = "Host: %s:%d"
$ = "Pragma: no-cache"
$ = "Connection: Keep-Alive"
$ = "HTTP/1.0"
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (all of them)
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
Scenario: Legitimate system update using Microsoft Update
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "wuauclt.exe" or process.name == "msiexec.exe"
Scenario: Scheduled backup job using Veeam Backup & Replication
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "veeambackup.exe" or process.name == "Veeam.Backup.Service"
Scenario: Administrative task using PowerShell for log cleanup
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "powershell.exe" && process.args contains "Clear-EventLog"
Scenario: Antivirus scan using Windows Defender
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "MsMpEng.exe" or process.name == "WindowsDefender.exe"
Scenario: System configuration using Group Policy Management Console (GPMC)
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "gpmc.msc" or process.name == "gpupdate.exe"