This detection identifies the presence of the Armadillov160a malware signature within endpoint logs, indicating potential file-based execution or persistence attempts by an adversary. Proactively hunting for this indicator in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to validate low-severity alerts against broader threat intelligence and prevent silent lateral movement before it escalates into a critical incident.
rule Armadillov160a
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 55 8B EC 6A FF 68 98 71 40 00 68 48 2D 40 00 64 A1 00 00 00 00 50 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 83 EC 58 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Armadillov160a detection rule, along with targeted filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates
MpCmdRun.exe or SymantecEngine.exe) extracts new definition packages that match the specific YARA signature patterns of Armadillov160a due to similar PE header structures or embedded script logic.MpCmdRun.exe, SymantecEngine.exe) and restrict the detection scope to exclude events occurring between 02:00 and 04:00 UTC. Alternatively, add these specific executable paths to the YARA rule’s exclude list.Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune
WUAHandler.exe or CcmExec.exe) extracts and installs patches that contain compressed archives with signatures mimicking the Armadillov160a heuristic, triggering alerts on the client machines.CcmExec.exe. Additionally, add a specific path exclusion for the software distribution point directory (e.g., \\<SCCMServer>\SoftwareDistribution\Content).Scenario: Backup Agent Data Indexing