This rule targets specific memory patterns associated with the Armadillo malware family, indicating potential in-memory execution or obfuscated payload deployment. Proactively hunting for this signature helps identify stealthy post-exploitation activities that may bypass traditional file-based detections, ensuring early containment of low-severity but persistent threats within the Azure Sentinel environment.
rule Armadillov190b1
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 55 8B EC 6A FF 68 E0 C1 40 00 68 04 89 40 00 64 A1 00 00 00 00 50 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 83 EC 58 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
armadillo CLI tool (or a similar internal binary named armadillov190b1) to perform local configuration validation or data transformation tasks on a build server or workstation.
msbuild.exe, dotnet.exe, npm.exe) or where the process path resides in standard development directories (e.g., C:\Users\<User>\.nuget\, C:\dev\, C:\projects\).armadillov190b1 binary as part of a nightly data ingestion pipeline or log rotation job, often triggered by Task Scheduler or a custom service wrapper.
Task Scheduler (taskschd.msi or svchost.exe with specific service context) or where the process is spawned by a known service executable (e.g., DataIngestionService.exe) and runs under a dedicated service account (e.g., svc-data-pipeline).armadillov190b1 tool during a vulnerability assessment, penetration test, or internal audit to verify configuration states or test detection coverage.
Sec-Team, Audit-Admins) or where the process is launched from a temporary analysis directory (e.g., C:\Temp\audit-tools\, C:\Pentest\) and the user has elevated privileges (admin token).