Armadillov4000053SiliconRealmsToolworks

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies the presence of the Silicon Realms Toolworks utility within the environment by leveraging a specific YARA signature to flag potential tool usage or deployment activities. Proactive hunting for this indicator is essential in Azure Sentinel to establish a baseline for legitimate administrative tools and distinguish them from adversaries who may leverage similar utilities to maintain persistence or execute reconnaissance tasks.

YARA Rule

rule Armadillov4000053SiliconRealmsToolworks
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 55 8B EC 6A FF 68 20 8B 4B 00 68 80 E4 48 00 64 A1 00 00 00 00 50 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 83 EC 58 53 56 57 89 65 E8 FF 15 88 31 4B 00 33 D2 8A D4 89 15 A4 A1 4B 00 8B C8 81 E1 FF 00 00 00 89 0D A0 A1 4B 00 C1 E1 08 03 CA 89 0D 9C A1 4B 00 C1 E8 10 A3 98 A1 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 3-5 specific false positive scenarios for the Armadillov4000053SiliconRealmsToolworks detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Scheduled Endpoint Protection Updates via Silicon Realms Agent

  • Context: The enterprise deploys “Silicon Realms Security Suite” which performs automated nightly updates. During the update window (e.g., 02:00 AM), the SiliconRealmsUpdater.exe process spawns child processes to download and install patches, triggering the YARA signature due to specific code patterns in the updater binary.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist exclusion for the process path C:\Program Files\Silicon Realms\Security Suite\Bin\SiliconRealmsUpdater.exe and its associated PID range during the maintenance window (02:00–04:00).

• Scenario: Deployment of Custom Reporting Tool by IT Admins

  • Context: The internal “IT Ops” team utilizes a custom PowerShell-based reporting utility named ArmadilloReportGen to aggregate system logs. This tool is signed with the same certificate chain used by Silicon Realms and executes frequently on domain controllers, causing the YARA rule to match its executable structure as a potential threat.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude files located in the directory C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\ArmadilloReportGen or filter alerts where the process name matches ArmadilloReportGen.exe and the user context is restricted to the DOMAIN-IT_OPS group.

• Scenario: Automated Backup Job Execution by Veeam Integration

  • Context: The organization uses a backup solution integrated with Silicon Realms tools. A scheduled job runs every 4 hours, invoking the SiliconRealmsBackupAgent