ASProtectv12AlexeySolodovnikovh1

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential execution of protected or obfuscated binaries associated with the ASProtect v12 signature, which adversaries often employ to evade static analysis and hide malicious payloads within legitimate processes. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel is essential to uncover stealthy threats that may bypass standard heuristic scans by leveraging advanced packing techniques to mask their true behavior during initial runtime.

YARA Rule

rule ASProtectv12AlexeySolodovnikovh1
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 90 60 E8 1B 00 00 00 E9 FC 8D B5 0F 06 00 00 8B FE B9 97 00 00 00 AD 35 78 56 34 12 AB 49 75 F6 EB 04 5D 45 55 C3 E9 [3] 00 }

condition:
		$a0
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ASProtect v12 detection rule, tailored for an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Deployment of Licensed Software via Endpoint Management

  • Context: IT administrators use tools like Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager) or Ivanti Neurons to push protected applications (e.g., specialized CAD software or financial modeling tools) to endpoints. The ASProtect v12 container is extracted during the installation phase, triggering the rule on the client machine’s file system monitor.
  • Suggested Filter: Exclude processes spawned by known deployment agents. Add a filter for ProcessName containing ccmsetup.exe, IvantiAgent.exe, or wuauserv.exe when the parent process is a trusted management service.

• Scenario: Execution of Scheduled Maintenance Scripts

  • Context: A nightly scheduled job (e.g., via Windows Task Scheduler) runs a custom PowerShell script to update local license databases for protected applications. The script invokes an ASProtect v12 wrapper executable (asprotect.exe) to validate licenses, causing the YARA rule to match the binary in memory or on disk during the run window.
  • Suggested Filter: Create a time-based exclusion window (e.g., 01:00 – 04:00 local time) for specific file paths located in C:\Program Files\ProtectedApps\. Alternatively, exclude events where the CommandLine contains keywords like “LicenseValidation” or “ScheduledUpdate”.

• Scenario: Antivirus Real-Time Scanning of Protected Binaries

  • Context: Enterprise-grade antivirus solutions such as CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint perform real-time heuristic scanning. When these agents scan the ASProtect v12 container itself (which often contains packed code