AZProtect0001byAlexZakaAZCRC

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies specific file artifacts matching the AZProtect0001 signature to uncover potential unauthorized or malicious code execution within Azure workloads. Proactively hunting for this indicator allows the SOC team to validate early-stage threats and assess their impact before they escalate into broader security incidents.

YARA Rule

rule AZProtect0001byAlexZakaAZCRC
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { EB 70 FC 60 8C 80 4D 11 00 70 25 81 00 40 0D 91 BB 60 8C 80 4D 11 00 70 21 81 1D 61 0D 81 00 40 CE 60 8C 80 4D 11 00 70 25 81 25 81 25 81 25 81 29 61 41 81 31 61 1D 61 00 40 B7 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 BE 00 [2] 00 BF 00 00 40 00 EB 17 4B 45 52 4E 45 4C 33 32 2E 44 4C 4C 00 00 00 00 00 FF 25 [3] 00 8B C6 03 C7 8B F8 57 55 8B EC 05 7F 00 00 00 50 E8 E5 FF FF FF BA 8C [2] 00 89 02 E9 1A 01 00 00 ?? 00 00 00 47 65 74 4D 6F 64 75 6C 65 46 69 6C 65 4E 61 6D 65 41 00 47 65 74 56 6F 6C 75 6D 65 49 6E 66 6F 72 6D 61 74 69 6F 6E 41 00 4D 65 73 73 61 67 65 42 6F 78 41 00 45 78 69 74 50 72 6F 63 65 73 73 00 47 65 74 4D 6F 64 75 6C 65 48 61 6E 64 6C 65 41 }
	$a1 = { FC 33 C9 49 8B D1 33 C0 33 DB AC 32 C1 8A CD 8A EA 8A D6 B6 08 66 D1 EB 66 D1 D8 73 09 66 35 20 83 66 81 F3 B8 ED FE CE 75 EB 33 C8 33 D3 4F 75 D5 F7 D2 F7 D1 8B C2 C1 C0 10 66 8B C1 C3 F0 DA 55 8B EC 53 56 33 C9 33 DB 8B 4D 0C 8B 55 10 8B 75 08 4E 4A 83 FB 08 72 05 33 DB 43 EB 01 43 33 C0 8A 04 31 8A 24 13 2A C4 88 04 31 E2 E6 5E 5B C9 C2 0C }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point or $a1
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the AZProtect0001byAlexZakaAZCRC YARA rule in an enterprise environment, along with targeted filtering strategies:

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Scans on Critical Directories

  • Context: Enterprise-grade antivirus solutions like Microsoft Defender ATP or Symantec Endpoint Protection often perform deep scans of the C:\Program Files directory during off-hours. The YARA rule may flag the scanning engine’s temporary file extraction or heuristic analysis processes as suspicious activity due to their high I/O and memory footprint matching the rule’s signature for “suspicious process behavior.”
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist exclusion based on the executable path C:\Program Files\Microsoft Defender\MsMpEng.exe (or equivalent vendor paths) and restrict the alert trigger to exclude processes running under the SYSTEM or specific service accounts (e.g., NT SERVICE\AntivirusService) during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 local time).

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via Configuration Management

  • Context: Tools like Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager) or Ansible execute automated patching jobs that involve downloading, unpacking, and installing updates. These tools frequently spawn child processes with randomized temporary names or utilize PowerShell scripts to apply changes, which can mimic the “suspicious script execution” pattern detected by AZProtect0001byAlexZakaAZCRC.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter that excludes alerts where the parent process is ccmsetup.exe (SCCM) or ansible-runner, and the command line contains keywords such as “patch,” “update,” or specific job IDs associated with the deployment pipeline.

• Scenario: Database Backup and Integrity Checks