This hypothesis targets the presence of the BeRoEXE packer, a tool frequently used by adversaries to compress and obfuscate executable files to evade static analysis and signature-based detection. Proactively hunting for this specific packer in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to identify potentially malicious or stealthy payloads that may be executing within the environment, providing early visibility into threats that leverage packing techniques to hide their true nature.
rule BeRoEXEPackerV100BeRo
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { BA [4] 8D B2 [4] 8B 46 ?? 85 C0 74 51 03 C2 8B 7E ?? 8B 1E 85 DB 75 02 8B DF 03 DA 03 FA 52 57 50 FF 15 [4] 5F 5A 85 C0 74 2F 8B C8 8B 03 85 C0 74 22 0F BA F0 1F 72 04 8D 44 [2] 51 52 57 50 51 FF 15 [4] 5F 5A 59 85 C0 74 0B AB 83 C3 04 EB D8 83 C6 14 EB AA 61 C3 }
condition:
$a0
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: A developer or build engineer uses UPX (Ultimate Packer for eXecutables) to compress native C++/C# CLI tools or microservices to reduce deployment size and improve load times. Since UPX employs specific compression algorithms and header structures that can mimic the “BeRo” packer signature, the resulting binary may match the YARA rule.
C:\Builds\artifacts\, D:\Deploy\dist\) or filter by file extension .exe combined with a known build server hostname. Alternatively, add a YARA exclusion for binaries containing the UPX! magic string in their headers if the rule is overly broad.Scenario: An IT administrator runs WinRAR or 7-Zip to self-extract a large software package (e.g., a custom internal application installer) that contains packed executables. The extraction process creates temporary .exe files in the %TEMP% directory that retain the packing characteristics of the original compressed archive, triggering the detection during the brief window before the installer completes.
WinRAR.exe, 7zFM.exe, or explorer.exe performing extraction tasks, and limit the scope to files created within the last 5 minutes in %TEMP% or %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp.Scenario: A security team deploys a custom internal patching utility written in Go or Rust, which is compiled with a linker that applies lightweight compression or obfuscation for size optimization. If the compiler flags include specific packing options or if the tool is wrapped in a custom launcher that uses a known packing algorithm, the binary may exhibit structural similarities to the BeRo packer.