This hypothesis targets the presence of executable files packed with the LZBRS algorithm, a technique often used by adversaries to compress payloads and evade static analysis during initial access or lateral movement. Proactively hunting for these specific packed binaries in Azure Sentinel helps identify low-severity anomalies that may indicate stealthy malware staging or obfuscated tooling before they trigger more complex behavioral detections.
rule BeRoEXEPackerv100DLLLZBRSBeRoFarbrausch
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 83 7C 24 08 01 0F 85 [4] 60 BE [4] BF [4] FC AD 8D 1C 07 B0 80 3B FB 73 3B E8 [4] 72 03 A4 EB F2 E8 [4] 8D 51 FF E8 [4] 56 8B F7 2B F2 F3 A4 5E EB DB 02 C0 75 03 AC 12 C0 C3 33 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
msbuild.exe, dotnet.exe, python.exe running a build script) or where the file path resides in a dedicated build artifact directory (e.g., C:\Builds\, D:\Artifacts\).7z.exe) or WinRAR (WinRAR.exe) by an administrator to compress a large log archive or backup set, where the compression algorithm (LZMA/BZIP2) matches the “LZBRS” heuristic in the rule name.
explorer.exe (user-driven compression) or specific administrative scripts (e.g., backup.ps1, compress_logs.bat) that explicitly invoke compression tools.git.exe) or Visual Studio Code (code.exe) when performing repository operations that involve packing or compressing objects, particularly if the rule triggers on the internal DLLs used for compression.
git.exe, code.exe, or node.exe (common in VS Code extensions) and the working directory is within a known source code repository path (e.g., C:\Src\, C:\Projects\).java.exe) or JVM-based applications (e.g., Tomcat, Spring Boot) that use native compression libraries (like ZLIB or BZIP2) for data processing or logging,