This detection identifies potential Farbransch malware activity by leveraging a specific YARA signature to locate packed executable files and DLLs that exhibit known behavioral characteristics of this threat family. SOC teams should proactively hunt for these artifacts in their Azure Sentinel environment to uncover early-stage infections or dormant threats that may evade standard signature-based defenses, ensuring timely containment before lateral movement occurs.
rule BeRoEXEPackerv100DLLLZMABeRoFarbrausch
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 83 7C 24 08 01 0F 85 [4] 60 68 [4] 68 [4] 68 [4] E8 [4] BE [4] B9 [4] 8B F9 81 FE [4] 7F 10 AC 47 04 18 2C 02 73 F0 29 3E 03 F1 03 F9 EB E8 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the BeRoEXEPackerv100DLLLZMABeRoFarbrausch detection rule, along with targeted exclusion strategies:
Scenario: Legitimate deployment of Microsoft Office Click-to-Run (C2R) updates.
OfficeClickToRun.exe process frequently extracts and loads DLLs packed with the “BeRo Farbrausch” algorithm during background update cycles, particularly when installing new language packs or feature sets on Windows 10/11 endpoints.OfficeClickToRun.exe (Path: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\...) and exclude any child processes generated by this parent that match the rule signature during the 08:00–10:00 AM business window.Scenario: Execution of Acronis Cyber Protect or Veeam Backup & Replication agents.
C:\Program Files\Acronis\Cyber Protect\Agent and C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup and Replication Enterprise. Additionally, filter out events where the process name contains “VeeamTransportService” or “AcronisAgent”.Scenario: Automated installation of Adobe Creative Cloud components.
CreativeCloud.exe) often unpacks and installs shared libraries (such as CoreSync.dll or