This detection identifies potential code obfuscation or encryption activities within executable files that may indicate an adversary attempting to evade static analysis and hide malicious logic. The SOC team should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to uncover stealthy threats that traditional signature-based tools might miss, ensuring early identification of sophisticated fileless or packed malware campaigns.
rule CodeCryptv015b
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E9 31 03 00 00 EB 02 83 3D 58 EB 02 FF 1D 5B EB 02 0F C7 5F }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 3-5 specific false positive scenarios for the CodeCryptv015b detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Antivirus Engine Real-Time Scanning of Large Archives
.zip or .7z archives containing encrypted payloads. When the AV engine extracts and scans these files, its internal cryptographic modules may trigger the CodeCryptv015b signature due to the presence of embedded encryption libraries within the archive structure.C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Scans\History). Alternatively, filter alerts where the parent process is the specific AV engine service (e.g., MsMpEng.exe or FalconSensorService.exe) and the file extension matches .zip, .7z, or .cab.Scenario: Scheduled Backup Jobs Executing Encrypted Snapshots
VeeamBRService.exe, CommServeAgent.exe). Additionally, exclude file paths located within dedicated backup staging folders like D:\BackupStaging\ or `C:\Program Files