This detection identifies the presence of the DingBoy malware variant within the environment by leveraging specific YARA signatures to capture its unique behavioral patterns. Proactive hunting for this threat in Azure Sentinel is essential to uncover early-stage infections that may evade standard signature-based defenses and prevent potential lateral movement before escalation.
rule DBPEv210DingBoy
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { EB 20 [32] 9C 55 57 56 52 51 53 9C E8 [4] 5D 81 ED [4] EB 58 75 73 65 72 33 32 2E 64 6C 6C ?? 4D 65 73 73 61 67 65 42 6F 78 41 ?? 6B 65 72 6E 65 6C }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the DBPEv210DingBoy detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Microsoft Defender Antivirus Real-Time Protection Scans
MsMpEng.exe process (Microsoft Defender) frequently scans database files in real-time. When scanning large .mdf or .ldf files on SQL Server instances, the YARA rule may match the signature of the antivirus engine’s internal DLLs as a potential “DingBoy” artifact due to overlapping memory patterns.C:\Program Files\Microsoft Defender Antivirus\msmpeng.exe and exclude file extensions .mdf, .ldf, and .bak from the rule’s scope when executed by this specific parent process.Scenario: Scheduled SQL Server Maintenance Plans (DBCC CHECKDB)
sqlagent.exe or custom PowerShell scripts to execute DBCC CHECKDB. These operations involve heavy I/O and memory allocation that mimic the behavior of the detected anomaly, particularly when accessing system databases like master or model.SQLServerAgent.exe (PID > 1000) running on known SQL Server hostnames ending in -DB-PROD.Scenario: Oracle Database Backup Jobs via RMAN
rman.exe) or oracle.exe processes perform incremental backups that involve complex file locking and memory mapping. The YARA signature