DxPack10

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential malicious activity associated with the DxPack10 signature, which may indicate the presence of specific software packaging anomalies or known threat indicators within the environment. Proactively hunting for this signal in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to validate low-severity alerts that could represent early-stage compromise vectors before they escalate into critical incidents.

YARA Rule

rule DxPack10
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 60 E8 [4] 5D 8B FD 81 ED [4] 2B B9 [4] 81 EF [4] 83 BD [4] ?? 0F 84 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the DxPack10 detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions suitable for an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM)

  • Context: The SCCM client service (ccmexec.exe) frequently executes installation packages containing diagnostic components that match the DxPack10 signature during scheduled maintenance windows.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a process exclusion for C:\Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager\inboxes\client\ccmexec.exe and add a path-based filter to ignore any file operations originating from the SCCM installation directory (C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\ConfigMgr).

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates (CrowdStrike Falcon)

  • Context: The CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor (csfalcon.sys) or FalconService.exe periodically downloads and unpacks definition updates that include diagnostic payloads triggering the YARA rule.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Configure an exclusion in the detection logic to ignore events where the parent process is C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\FalconSensor\csfalcon.exe or when the file hash matches known CrowdStrike update signatures (e.g., specific SHA256 ranges for the current quarter).

• Scenario: Enterprise Backup Agent Operations (Veeam Backup & Replication)

  • Context: The Veeam Transport Service (vss.exe) creates temporary diagnostic logs and unpacks backup metadata during nightly jobs, which often contain binary structures resembling the DxPack10 pattern.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based filter to suppress alerts between 22:00 and 06:00 for processes running under the Veeam user context, or explicitly exclude the path `C:\Program Files\Veeam