Enigmaprotector110111VladimirSukhov

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis targets the presence of the Enigma Protector 11.01.11 packer (associated with Vladimir Sukhov) within the environment to identify potentially obfuscated or repackaged executables that may conceal malicious payloads. A proactive search in Azure Sentinel is recommended because this specific packing tool is frequently leveraged by threat actors to evade signature-based detection and mask suspicious runtime behaviors, warranting deeper investigation despite its current low severity classification.

YARA Rule

rule Enigmaprotector110111VladimirSukhov
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 83 ED 06 81 ED [35] E8 01 00 00 00 9A 83 C4 04 EB 02 FF 35 60 E8 24 00 00 00 00 00 FF EB 02 CD 20 8B 44 24 0C 83 80 B8 00 00 00 03 31 }
	$a1 = { 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 83 ED 06 81 ED [35] E8 01 00 00 00 9A 83 C4 04 EB 02 FF 35 60 E8 24 00 00 00 00 00 FF EB 02 CD 20 8B 44 24 0C 83 80 B8 00 00 00 03 31 C0 C3 83 C0 08 EB 02 FF 15 89 C4 61 EB 2E EA EB 2B 83 04 24 03 EB 01 00 31 C0 EB 01 85 64 FF 30 EB 01 83 64 89 20 EB 02 CD 20 89 00 9A 64 8F 05 00 00 00 00 EB 02 C1 90 58 61 EB 01 3E EB [41] E8 01 00 00 00 9A 83 C4 04 01 E8 [31] E8 01 00 00 00 9A 83 C4 04 05 F6 01 00 00 [31] E8 01 00 00 00 9A 83 C4 04 B9 3D 1A }

condition:
		$a0 or $a1
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Enigmaprotector110111VladimirSukhov detection rule, tailored for an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated deployment of security agents by Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune.

  • Context: During scheduled maintenance windows, the deployment engine pushes updates to the Enigma Protector runtime libraries on thousands of endpoints simultaneously. The YARA rule triggers because the update installer mimics the signature of the protected executable structure defined in the rule.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist exclusion for processes spawned by ccmsetup.exe, msiexec.exe, or IntuneManagementExtension.exe where the parent process is running under the SYSTEM account and the file path contains \Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager\.

• Scenario: Execution of third-party backup solutions like Veeam Backup & Replication or Acronis Cyber Protect.

  • Context: These tools often utilize custom compression algorithms that generate temporary artifacts with PE headers similar to the Enigma Protector structure. When the backup service scans a directory containing previously protected applications, it generates file hashes that match the rule’s signature logic.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the parent process is VeeamTransport.exe, AcronisAgentService.exe, or BackupEngine.exe and the event type is “File Creation” rather than “Process Execution.”

• Scenario: Routine execution of internal DevOps build pipelines using Jenkins or GitLab CI/CD runners.

  • Context: Build agents frequently compile and package applications that utilize Enigma Protector for licensing. The YARA rule triggers during the artifact staging phase where protected binaries are unpacked into temporary workspaces, causing a high volume of detections on build servers.