This detection identifies potential file encryption activities characteristic of ransomware or data exfiltration attempts by monitoring for specific executable behaviors defined in the EXECryptorv1401 YARA rule. Proactive hunting is essential because early identification of these low-severity encryption events allows the SOC team to investigate and contain threats before they escalate into full-scale ransomware incidents within the Azure Sentinel environment.
rule EXECryptorv1401
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E8 24 00 00 00 8B 4C 24 0C C7 01 17 00 01 00 C7 81 B8 00 00 00 00 [2] 00 31 C0 89 41 14 89 41 18 80 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the EXECryptorv1401 detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Microsoft Office Background Auto-Save & Encryption
.docx, .xlsx) in Microsoft 365, the background process OfficeClickToRun.exe or OneDrive.exe often encrypts temporary cache files and auto-save versions. This behavior matches the signature of an executable performing bulk file encryption operations typical of ransomware.ImageFileName containing *Microsoft Office*, *OneDrive.exe*, or *OfficeClickToRun.exe* where the parent process is a known Office application, specifically when the target files are located in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp or %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office.Scenario: Enterprise Backup Agent Scheduled Job
DOMAIN\svc_backup) or image paths containing \Program Files\Veeam, \Rubrik, or \Acronis. Additionally, filter out events occurring during the defined maintenance window (01:00–05:00) where the process command line contains keywords like “backup,” “snapshot,” or “sync.”Scenario: Antivirus Real-Time Scanning and Quarantine