This hunt hypothesis targets the presence of the eXPressor v12 CG Soft Labs application or associated artifacts within the environment to identify potential software supply chain anomalies or unauthorized installations. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to validate legitimate deployments and quickly distinguish them from malicious impersonation attempts, ensuring low-severity signals do not obscure critical threats.
rule eXPressorv12CGSoftLabs
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 45 78 50 72 2D 76 2E 31 2E 32 2E }
$a1 = { 55 8B EC 81 EC D4 01 00 00 53 56 57 EB 0C 45 78 50 72 2D 76 2E 31 2E 32 2E 2E B8 [4] 2B 05 84 [3] A3 [4] 83 3D [4] 00 74 16 A1 [4] 03 05 80 [3] 89 85 54 FE FF FF E9 ?? 07 00 00 C7 05 [4] 01 00 00 00 68 04 }
$a2 = { 55 8B EC 81 EC D4 01 00 00 53 56 57 EB 0C 45 78 50 72 2D 76 2E 31 2E 32 2E 2E B8 [4] 2B 05 84 [3] A3 [4] 83 3D [4] 00 74 16 A1 [4] 03 05 80 [3] 89 85 54 FE FF FF E9 ?? 07 00 00 C7 05 [4] 01 00 00 00 68 04 01 00 00 8D 85 F0 FE FF FF 50 6A 00 FF 15 }
condition:
$a0 or $a1 at pe.entry_point or $a2 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 3 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 3-5 specific false positive scenarios for the eXPressorv12CGSoftLabs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Scheduled PDF Generation via Microsoft Word Automation
WINWORD.EXE which calls the eXPressor library (often embedded within third-party reporting tools like Crystal Reports or custom .NET apps) to convert documents to PDF.WINWORD.EXE running from a known service account (e.g., DOMAIN\svc_report_gen) and the eXPressor DLL resides in the C:\Program Files\Common Files\CGSoftLabs\ directory.exclude if parent_process == "WINWORD.EXE" AND file_path contains "Common Files\CGSoftLabs"Scenario: Deployment of Internal Document Management System (DMS) Updates
ccmsetup.exe or msiexec.exe during business hours (08:00–17:00) when maintenance windows are active.