This detection identifies potential Visual Basic MASM32 scripts that may indicate early-stage adversary activity involving custom or obfuscated automation tools within the environment. Proactive hunting is essential to validate these low-severity signals and distinguish legitimate administrative tasks from stealthy initial access attempts that could evolve into more critical threats if left uninvestigated.
rule FSGv110EngdulekxtMicrosoftVisualBasicMASM32
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { EB 02 09 94 0F B7 FF 68 80 [2] 00 81 F6 8E 00 00 00 5B EB 02 11 C2 8D 05 F4 00 00 00 47 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the FSGv110EngdulekxtMicrosoftVisualBasicMASM32 detection rule, which targets Microsoft Visual Basic MASM32 executables:
Scenario: Legacy HR Payroll Processing via VBScript Wrapper
Task Scheduler) that wraps the .exe in a VBScript to handle data ingestion before launching the main MASM32 executable.Microsoft Visual Basic processes (e.g., vb6.exe, msvbvm50.dll) located in C:\Apps\LegacyPayroll\ where the parent process is svchost.exe or cscript.exe.Path contains "C:\Apps\LegacyPayroll" AND ParentProcess IN ("svchost.exe", "cscript.exe").Scenario: Automated Report Generation by Crystal Reports
cron or Windows Task Scheduler.svc-crystal) running within the known application directory.UserAccount == "svc-crystal" AND Path starts with "C:\Program Files (x86)\SAP BusinessObjects\CrystalReports\".**Scenario: Endpoint Security Agent