gholeeV2

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis targets adversaries executing the GhoLee malware variant by leveraging its specific YARA signature to identify known malicious code patterns within Azure Sentinel workloads. Proactive hunting for this low-severity indicator is essential to detect early-stage infections that may evade standard alerting thresholds, allowing the SOC team to isolate compromised assets before lateral movement occurs.

YARA Rule

rule gholeeV2
{
   meta:
	Author = "@GelosSnake"
	Date = "2015-02-12"
    	Description = "Gholee first discovered variant "
	Reference = "http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28170/cyber-crime/gholee-malware.html" 

   strings:
	$string0 = "RichHa"
	$string1 = "         (((((                  H" wide
	$string2 = "1$1,141<1D1L1T1\\1d1l1t1"
	$string3 = "<8;$O' "
	$string4 = "@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]"
	$string5 = "jYPQTVTSkllZTTXRTUiHceWda/"
	$string6 = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1"
	$string7 = "8.848H8O8i8s8y8"
	$string8 = "wrapper3" wide
	$string9 = "pwwwwwwww"
	$string10 = "Sunday"
	$string11 = "YYuTVWh"
	$string12 = "DDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDIN"
	$string13 = "ytMMMMMMUbbrrrrrxxxxxxxxrriUMMMMMMMMMUuzt"
	$string15 = "wrapper3 Version 1.0" wide
	$string16 = "77A779"
	$string17 = "<C<G<M<R<X<"
	$string18 = "9 9-9N9X9s9"

    condition:
	18 of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 18 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the gholeeV2 detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters or exclusions:

• Endpoint Protection Policy Updates via Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

  • Scenario: The MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Antimalware) service performs scheduled definition updates and engine scans. During these operations, the YARA rule may match legitimate signature files or temporary cache artifacts generated by the AV engine itself, mistaking them for the Gholee payload structure.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude file paths containing C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender and process parents named MsMpEng.exe. Additionally, filter out events where the FileHash matches known Microsoft-signed binaries (Publisher: “Microsoft Corporation”).

• Enterprise Software Deployment via SCCM or Intune

  • Scenario: During a scheduled maintenance window, System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune deploys new application packages. The deployment agent (ccmexec.exe or IntuneManagementExtension) extracts compressed archives containing legitimate executables that share structural similarities with the Gholee malware family, triggering the YARA rule on temporary extraction folders.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for processes initiated by ccmexec.exe, ccmgrui.exe, or IntuneManagementExtension. Specifically, exclude file paths under %TEMP%\CCMCache and %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Intune Management Extension.

• Automated Backup and Snapshot Operations (Veeam or Commvault)

  • Scenario: Enterprise backup solutions like Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault perform incremental backups of critical servers. The backup agents (vbr.exe or simagent) often create temporary checkpoint files or mount virtual disks that replicate the file system structure of the source, potentially containing legitimate