This hunt hypothesizes that adversaries are deploying C#-based red or black team tools within the environment, identifiable by unique TypeLibGUID artifacts often used to evade standard signature-based detection. Proactively hunting for these GUIDs in Azure Sentinel is critical because it allows the SOC team to distinguish between legitimate internal tooling and potential adversary infrastructure before malicious activity escalates.
rule HKTL_NET_GUID_Evasor {
meta:
description = "Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid"
reference = "https://github.com/cyberark/Evasor"
author = "Arnim Rupp"
date = "2020-12-13"
strings:
$typelibguid0 = "1c8849ef-ad09-4727-bf81-1f777bd1aef8" ascii nocase wide
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and any of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the Detects C# Red/Black-Team Tools via TypelibGUID rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scheduled Automated Patch Deployment (Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager)
ccmexec.exe) or a scheduled task triggers a deployment agent that utilizes the System.Windows.Forms or System.Drawing libraries. These standard .NET Framework components share specific TypeLib GUIDs often flagged as “Red Team” reconnaissance tools when they are actually part of routine patching workflows running under the SYSTEM or Network Service accounts.\Microsoft\CCM\ and the user context is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Additionally, filter out TypeLib GUIDs associated with standard Microsoft framework assemblies (e.g., 91493436-7A90-11CF-8E27-0050E5CBBA4C for stdole) unless the process is running from a non-standard user directory.Enterprise License Compliance Scanning (FlexNet or Snow Software)
fnmsvc.exe) or Snow Software Discovery Agent run periodic scans to inventory installed software and hardware. These C#-based tools load specific TypeLib GUIDs for COM interop during the discovery phase, mimicking the behavior of active Red Team enumeration scripts that probe system configurations.fnmsvc.exe, SnowAgent.exe) located in their default installation paths (e.g., C:\Program Files\ManageEngine or C:\ProgramData\Snow Software). Whitelist the specific TypeLib GUIDs generated by