This detection identifies the execution of files packed with UPX version 1.2, a technique frequently employed by adversaries to obscure malicious payloads and evade static analysis. A proactive hunt is essential in Azure Sentinel to uncover stealthy threats that may bypass initial signature-based defenses by leveraging this specific compression method to hide suspicious behavior within legitimate processes.
rule hmimysPackerV12hmimys
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E8 95 00 00 00 [149] 5E AD 50 AD 50 97 AD 50 AD 50 AD 50 E8 C0 01 00 00 AD 50 AD 93 87 DE B9 [4] E3 1D 8A 07 47 04 ?? 3C ?? 73 F7 8B 07 3C ?? 75 F3 B0 00 0F C8 05 [4] 2B C7 AB E2 E3 AD 85 C0 74 2B 97 56 FF 13 8B E8 AC 84 C0 75 FB 66 AD 66 85 C0 74 E9 AC 83 EE 03 84 C0 74 08 56 55 FF 53 04 AB EB E4 AD 50 55 FF 53 04 AB EB E0 C3 8B 0A 3B 4A 04 75 0A C7 42 10 01 00 00 00 0C FF C3 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the hmimysPackerV12hmimys detection rule, along with targeted exclusion strategies:
Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager\AdminConsole or C:\Windows\CCM). Additionally, exclude processes with names like ccmsetup.exe, intuneagent.exe, and msiexec.exe when running under the SYSTEM account.Scenario: Scheduled Backup Jobs Using Veeam or Acronis
VeeamAgent.exe, AcronisBackupService.exe, and vssadmin.exe. Configure the filter to ignore alerts originating from these processes when they are running during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00 – 06:00 local time).Scenario: Internal Software Distribution via Chocolatey
.choco packages are packaged using the HMI MyS V1