This hypothesis posits that adversaries are deploying the specific malware signature identified by the IndiaEcho YARA rule to establish persistence or execute reconnaissance within our Azure environment. Proactively hunting for this indicator is critical because its low severity classification suggests it may be an early-stage threat that requires manual correlation with other telemetry before triggering automated high-priority alerts.
rule IndiaEcho
{
meta:
copyright = "2015 Novetta Solutions"
author = "Novetta Threat Research & Interdiction Group - trig@novetta.com"
Source = "66a21f8c72bb4f314604526e9bf1736f75b06cf37dd3077eb292941b476c3235"
strings:
/*
69 C0 28 01 00 00 imul eax, 128h
50 push eax ; size_t
53 push ebx ; int
FF B5 AC FD FF FF push [ebp+configRecords]; void *
E8 6E 08 00 00 call _memset
8B 85 A4 FC FF FF mov eax, [ebp+var_35C.dwRecordCnt]
69 C0 28 01 00 00 imul eax, 128h
50 push eax ; size_t
8B 85 C4 FE FF FF mov eax, [ebp+hMem]
05 08 01 00 00 add eax, 108h
50 push eax ; void *
FF B5 AC FD FF FF push [ebp+configRecords]; void *
E8 0A 05 00 00 call _memcpy
83 C4 18 add esp, 18h
8B BD A4 FC FF FF mov edi, [ebp+var_35C.dwRecordCnt]
69 FF 28 01 00 00 imul edi, 128h
81 C7 08 01 00 00 add edi, 108h
*/
$a = {69 ?? 28 01 00 00 5? 5? FF B5 [4] E8 [4] 8B [5] 69 ?? 28 01 00 00 50 8B [5] (05 08 01 00 00 | 03 ??) 50 FF [5] E8 [4] 83 C4 ?? 8B [5] 69 ?? 28 01 00 00 (81 C7 08 01 00 00 | 03 ??)}
condition:
$a in ((pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_offset)..(pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_offset + pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_size))
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the IndiaEcho detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via WSUS
wuauserv) or a third-party agent like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint automatically downloads and installs signature updates during the nightly maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 AM IST). These updates often involve unpacking large compressed archives containing executable payloads that match the IndiaEcho YARA signatures, particularly if the rule detects specific header structures common in security patches.NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM or user DOMAIN\WSUS-Admin running the process wuauclt.exe or MsMpEng.exe during the defined maintenance window (01:00–04:00).Enterprise Software Deployment via SCCM/MECM
msiexec.exe) extracts temporary files and scripts that contain code patterns identical to the threat signature, triggering alerts on multiple endpoints simultaneously.C:\Windows\CCM\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Configuration Manager\, specifically targeting the parent process ccmexec.exe.Automated Log Rotation and Archiving Scripts
LogRotator.ps1) scheduled via Task Scheduler runs daily to compress and archive application logs from critical servers. If the script utilizes a compression