This detection identifies the execution of InnoSetup installer modules from 2018, which adversaries may leverage to deliver custom payloads or obfuscate initial attack stages within the Azure environment. Proactively hunting for this behavior allows the SOC team to validate legitimate software deployments against potential anomalies in legacy installation patterns that could indicate early-stage compromise or supply chain manipulation.
rule InnoSetupModulev2018
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 55 8B EC 83 C4 B8 53 56 57 33 C0 89 45 F0 89 45 BC 89 45 B8 E8 73 71 FF FF E8 DA 85 FF FF E8 81 A7 FF FF E8 C8 }
condition:
$a0
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the InnoSetupModulev2018 detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Deployment of Standard Enterprise Software via SCCM/Intune
setup.exe) running under a known service account (e.g., NT SERVICE\CCM or SYSTEM). Additionally, filter by Parent Process being ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or IntuneManagementExtension.exe.Scenario: Scheduled Patching of Internal Line-of-Business Applications
svchost.exe (specifically the TaskScheduler service) and the execution time falls within a defined maintenance window (e.g., 01:00–04:00). Alternatively, whitelist the specific SHA-256 hash of the known internal installer executable.Scenario: Admin Manual Installation via Remote Desktop Session
.exe file downloaded from the corporate intr