LaunchAnywherev4001

Hunt Hypothesis

This rule detects the presence of the LaunchAnywhere v4.0.0.1 tool, a lightweight Windows utility often used by adversaries to execute payloads or establish footholds without leaving significant artifacts in standard logs. Proactively hunting for this specific version allows the SOC team to identify potential lateral movement or initial access attempts that may have bypassed traditional execution monitoring, ensuring early detection of low-severity but operationally significant tooling.

YARA Rule

rule LaunchAnywherev4001
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 55 89 E5 53 83 EC 48 55 B8 FF FF FF FF 50 50 68 E0 3E 42 00 64 FF 35 00 00 00 00 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 68 C0 69 44 00 E8 E4 80 FF FF 59 E8 4E 29 00 00 E8 C9 0D 00 00 85 C0 75 08 6A FF E8 6E 2B 00 00 59 E8 A8 2C 00 00 E8 23 2E 00 00 FF 15 4C C2 44 00 89 C3 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: A developer or IT administrator uses LaunchAnywhere (a legitimate commercial remote access and file transfer tool) to troubleshoot a user’s workstation or transfer large files between on-premises and cloud environments. The binary LaunchAnywhere.exe or its service component is executed from the default installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\LaunchAnywhere\) or a standard user profile location.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude execution paths matching C:\Program Files\LaunchAnywhere\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\LaunchAnywhere\ where the parent process is a known shell (explorer.exe) or a standard administrative tool, and the file hash matches the known good SHA256 of the current version.

• Scenario: An enterprise endpoint management solution (such as Microsoft Intune or SCCM) deploys or updates the LaunchAnywhere client via a scheduled task or configuration script. The update process may temporarily execute the installer or the main executable from a staging directory (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp\ or C:\ProgramData\) before moving it to the final location, triggering a “suspicious path” or “unexpected parent process” alert.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude executions where the parent process is a known management agent (e.g., CcmExec.exe, MsMpEng.exe, or Agent.exe from Intune/SCCM) and the execution path is within a standard temporary or staging directory (C:\Windows\Temp\, C:\ProgramData\).

• Scenario: A security team performs a controlled test or validation of the YARA rule by intentionally running the LaunchAnywhere binary in a sandboxed or isolated test environment (e.g., a dedicated jump host or CI/CD pipeline runner) to verify detection coverage. The binary is executed from a non