This detection identifies potential file-based threats or specific malware signatures captured by the MEGALITEv120a YARA rule within the Azure Sentinel environment. Proactive hunting for this indicator is essential to uncover early-stage infections that may not yet trigger high-severity alerts, allowing the SOC team to investigate and contain low-level anomalies before they escalate into broader incidents.
rule MEGALITEv120a
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { B8 [2] BA [2] 05 [2] 3B 2D 73 ?? 72 ?? B4 09 BA [2] CD 21 CD 90 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the MEGALITEv120a detection rule, formatted with actionable filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Legitimate execution of Microsoft Office Click-to-Run updates.
OfficeClickToRun.exe process frequently spawns child processes to download and install patches, which often match the YARA signature for MEGALITE due to its modular update architecture.C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office Click-to-Run\OfficeClickToRun.exe AND the command line contains /update.Scenario: Scheduled Windows Defender Antivirus real-time scanning.
MsMpEng.exe service performs periodic deep scans that load various signature modules, triggering the rule when specific heuristic patterns within the antivirus engine are loaded into memory.MsMpEng.exe running under the SYSTEM account with a high integrity level (e.g., IntegrityLevel == 'System').Scenario: Deployment of enterprise-wide Group Policy updates via SCCM.
ccmsetup.exe or WUAHandler.exe to push policy changes, which often instantiate temporary worker processes that mimic the behavioral footprint of MEGALITE.CcmExec.exe and the execution path resides within C:\Windows\CCM\.Scenario: Automated backup jobs utilizing Veeam Agent for Windows.
VeeamAgentService.exe launches multiple worker threads to compress data streams