This hypothesis targets the presence of the NeoLite v20 malware family, which is often deployed for initial access or lateral movement in enterprise environments. Proactively hunting for this signature allows the SOC team to identify compromised hosts early, preventing potential escalation of privileges or data exfiltration before the adversary establishes a persistent foothold.
rule NeoLitev20
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E9 [28] 4E 65 6F 4C 69 74 65 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
msiexec.exe, setup.exe, install.exe) or where the command line contains arguments like /i, /install, or --install.svchost.exe with specific service parameters, schtasks.exe, cron, or ansible-playbook) and the working directory is a known data or backup path (e.g., C:\Backups\, /var/backups/).dev, qa, or staging in the asset inventory, or exclude processes where the executable path resides in a development-specific directory (e.g., C:\Projects\, /home/user/dev/, C:\temp\test_app\).legacy_app.exe, config_manager.exe) that are documented to use NeoLite, or exclude if the NeoLite DLL is loaded by a process from a trusted application directory (e.g., `C