This hunt hypothesis targets adversaries leveraging the Nullsoft PIMP installer to execute legitimate-looking payloads that may serve as a precursor for lateral movement or persistence within the environment. Proactively hunting for this activity in Azure Sentinel is essential because low-severity installation events often mask initial access attempts, allowing threat actors to establish a foothold before triggering higher-fidelity alerts.
rule NullsoftPIMPInstallSystemv13x
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 55 8B EC 81 EC [2] 00 00 56 57 6A ?? BE [4] 59 8D BD }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the NullsoftPIMPInstallSystemv13x detection rule, along with recommended filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Scheduled Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune
PIMPInstallSystemv13x process is often invoked by the background service to handle the installation logic during off-hours maintenance windows.ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or Microsoft.Intune.ManagementAgent.exe running under the SYSTEM account or a specific service account (e.g., DOMAIN\svc-patch).Scenario: Automated Onboarding Scripts for New Hires
/S (silent) or --unattended.Scenario: Third-Party Antivirus or EDR Self-Upgrades