This detection identifies the presence of Obsidium software components within the environment to establish a baseline for legitimate application behavior and potential supply chain risks. Proactive hunting is essential in Azure Sentinel to distinguish these known binaries from anomalous execution patterns that could indicate unauthorized deployment or early-stage compromise by an adversary leveraging trusted software.
rule Obsidium1338ObsidiumSoftware
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { EB 04 [4] E8 28 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? EB 01 ?? 8B 54 24 0C EB 04 [4] 83 82 B8 00 00 00 ?? EB 04 [4] 33 C0 EB 03 [3] C3 EB 01 ?? EB 01 ?? 64 67 FF 36 00 00 EB 03 [3] 64 67 89 26 00 00 EB 02 [2] EB 01 ?? 50 EB 04 [4] 33 C0 EB 02 [2] 8B 00 EB 03 [3] C3 EB 03 [3] E9 FA 00 00 00 EB 03 [3] E8 D5 FF FF FF EB 02 [2] EB 04 [4] 58 EB 04 [4] EB 02 [2] 64 67 8F 06 00 00 EB 04 [4] 83 C4 04 EB 04 [4] E8 57 27 00 00 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Obsidium1338ObsidiumSoftware detection rule, along with suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Legitimate deployment of Obsidium software updates via Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM/MECM).
ObsidiumSetup.exe) matches the signature pattern intended for suspicious ad-hoc execution.ccmsetup.exe (SCCM Client) or WUAHandler.exe (Windows Update Agent), and restrict the trigger to the specific file path: C:\Program Files\Obsidium\Setup\.Scenario: Execution of Obsidium’s internal scheduled maintenance job by the Windows Task Scheduler.
Obsidium.SyncJob AND the User Account is the local system account (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM).Scenario: Administrative manual installation or configuration by a privileged Help Desk technician.
DOMAIN\HelpDesk_Admin) running non-standard scripts that invoke the Obsidium binary.