This detection identifies the presence of Obsidium software components within the environment to establish a baseline for legitimate application behavior and detect potential unauthorized installations or persistence mechanisms. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to validate known good assets against unexpected execution patterns, thereby reducing noise from false positives while ensuring that any deviations indicating adversary activity are promptly investigated.
rule ObsidiumV1300ObsidiumSoftware
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { EB 04 [4] E8 29 00 00 00 }
$a1 = { EB 04 [4] E8 ?? 00 00 00 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point or $a1 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ObsidiumV1300ObsidiumSoftware detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune
ObsidiumSetup.exe) executes on hundreds of workstations simultaneously, mistaking the mass deployment for a potential lateral movement or unauthorized installation event.ParentImage contains ccmsetup.exe (SCCM) or IntuneManagementExtension.exe, AND the AccountName is a known service account (e.g., DOMAIN\ObsidiumDeploySvc).Scenario: Scheduled Data Backup Job
ProcessCommandLine contains specific backup keywords (e.g., /backup, /archive) and the ImagePath resides in a dedicated system directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Obsidium\bin\). Additionally, exclude triggers occurring during the defined maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00 local time).Scenario: Admin Manual Installation via GPO