This hunt hypothesis targets adversaries who utilize the PackMaster v10 packing tool to obfuscate malicious executables and evade signature-based detection by altering file structures. Proactively hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical because packed files often mask embedded payloads that standard static analysis might miss, allowing attackers to establish a foothold before triggering higher-severity alerts.
rule PackMasterv10
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 60 E8 01 00 00 00 E8 83 C4 04 E8 01 00 00 00 E9 5D 81 ED D3 22 40 00 E8 04 02 00 00 E8 EB 08 EB 02 CD 20 FF 24 24 9A 66 BE 47 46 }
$a1 = { 60 E8 01 [3] E8 83 C4 04 E8 01 [3] E9 5D 81 ED D3 22 40 ?? E8 04 02 [2] E8 EB 08 EB 02 CD 20 FF 24 24 9A 66 BE 47 46 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point or $a1 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the PackMasterv10 detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Deployment of internal enterprise software updates via Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM/MECM) or Intune.
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager\AdminConsole and process names ending in ccmsetup.exe. Additionally, exclude files where the digital signature publisher is “Your Enterprise Name” (e.g., CN=Enterprise CA).Scenario: Execution of nightly scheduled backup jobs using Veeam Backup & Replication.
Veeam.Backup.Service user account and file paths located within C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup and Replication. Add a time-based filter to ignore alerts generated between 02:00 AM and 05:00 AM on backup servers.Scenario: Automated patching of third-party development tools (e.g., Visual Studio or JetBrains IDEs) via Chocolatey.