This detection identifies potential malicious or suspicious Portable Executable (PE) structures within files using a specific YARA signature to flag anomalies in binary packaging. Proactively hunting for this behavior allows the SOC team to uncover stealthy file-based threats that may evade standard signature-based defenses, ensuring early identification of compromised artifacts before they execute critical payloads.
rule PEPackv099
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 60 E8 [4] 5D 83 ED 06 80 BD E0 04 [2] 01 0F 84 F2 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the PEPackv099 detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Automated Antivirus Signature Updates
ImageName matches *DefenderSvc.exe, *Cfsservice.exe, or *csagent.exe and the parent process is the respective service host (e.g., svchost.exe). Additionally, filter out events occurring during known maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC) where signature updates are scheduled.Scenario: Scheduled Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune
ParentImage being ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or IntuneManagementExtension.exe. Furthermore, exclude events where the file hash matches known good hashes stored in a central asset inventory for standard deployment packages.Scenario: CI/CD Pipeline Artifact Generation
MSBuild or NuGet, which generate temporary packed executables that match the PEPackv099 signature.