Adversaries may leverage suspicious child processes of eventvwr.exe to bypass UAC and execute privileged code, indicating potential elevation of privilege. SOC teams should proactively hunt for
title: Potentially Suspicious Event Viewer Child Process
id: be344333-921d-4c4d-8bb8-e584cf584780
related:
- id: 7c81fec3-1c1d-43b0-996a-46753041b1b6
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes of "eventvwr.exe" which might indicate a UAC bypass attempt
references:
- https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e122bc8bf291f15cab182a5d2d27b8db1e7019e4e96bb5cdbd1dfe7446f3f51f?environmentId=100
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-19
modified: 2023-09-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
- car.2019-04-001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\eventvwr.exe'
filter_main_generic:
Image|endswith:
- ':\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
imProcessCreate
| where (ParentProcessName endswith "\\eventvwr.exe" or ActingProcessName endswith "\\eventvwr.exe") and (not((TargetProcessName endswith ":\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith ":\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith ":\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")))
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
imProcessCreate | Ensure this data connector is enabled |