PredatorPain

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis posits that adversaries are utilizing specific file execution patterns identified by the PredatorPain YARA signature to establish a foothold or execute initial reconnaissance within the environment. Proactive hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical because its low severity classification suggests it may be overlooked by automated alerts, requiring manual correlation with other telemetry to confirm early-stage attack activity before escalation occurs.

YARA Rule

rule PredatorPain : RAT
{

	meta:
		author = " Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>"
		date = "2014/04"
		ref = "http://malwareconfig.com/stats/PredatorPain"
		maltype = "Remote Access Trojan"
		filetype = "exe"

	strings:
		$string1 = "holderwb.txt" wide
		$string3 = "There is a file attached to this email" wide
		$string4 = "screens\\screenshot" wide
		$string5 = "Disablelogger" wide
		$string6 = "\\pidloc.txt" wide
        $string7 = "clearie" wide
        $string8 = "clearff" wide
        $string9 = "emails should be sent to you shortly" wide
        $string10 = "jagex_cache\\regPin" wide
        $string11 = "open=Sys.exe" wide
		$ver1 = "PredatorLogger" wide
		$ver2 = "EncryptedCredentials" wide
        $ver3 = "Predator Pain" wide

	condition:
		7 of ($string*) and any of ($ver*)
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 13 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the PredatorPain detection rule in an enterprise environment, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via Windows Update Agent

  • Context: The WindowsUpdateAgent service or third-party AV agents (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor, Microsoft Defender) frequently download and execute large definition database updates during off-hours. These processes often spawn child processes that match the “PredatorPain” signature due to their high I/O behavior and specific memory injection patterns used for real-time scanning.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule based on the parent process image path. Specifically, exclude events where ParentImage matches C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\* or known AV installation paths (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\*) and the event occurs during the standard maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00 local time).

• Scenario: Enterprise Software Deployment via SCCM/Intune

  • Context: During mass software deployments, tools like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune execute installation scripts that utilize PowerShell to modify registry keys and inject code into running explorer sessions. This activity often triggers the YARA rule’s logic regarding legitimate but aggressive process manipulation, mimicking the behavior of a “Predator” payload.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter excluding processes where the CommandLine contains specific deployment identifiers (e.g., -Machine, /quiet, or references to C:\Windows\CCMExec.exe). Additionally, whitelist the specific hash of the SCCM agent (ccmexec.exe) and its known child execution paths.

• Scenario: Automated Backup and Snapshot Operations

  • Context: Enterprise backup solutions