ProgramProtectorXPv10

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential legacy or custom executable execution patterns matching the ProgramProtectorXPv10 signature, which may indicate the presence of specialized security tools or anomalous software behavior within the environment. A proactive hunt is essential to validate these low-severity alerts against known inventory and distinguish legitimate administrative processes from stealthy adversary activity that mimics standard program protection mechanisms in Azure Sentinel.

YARA Rule

rule ProgramProtectorXPv10
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { E8 [4] 58 83 D8 05 89 C3 81 C3 [4] 8B 43 64 50 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ProgramProtectorXPv10 detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Microsoft Office Click-to-Run Self-Update Mechanism

  • Context: The Office Click-to-Run service (OfficeClickToRun.exe) periodically spawns child processes to download and apply feature updates or security patches. These processes often exhibit behavior patterns (file creation, registry modification) that mimic the rule’s detection logic for unauthorized program installation.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude process paths containing C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16 and specifically target the executable name OfficeClickToRun.exe. Additionally, filter out events where the parent process is svchost.exe with the service tag ClickToRunSvc.

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates (CrowdStrike/FireEye)

  • Context: Enterprise endpoint protection agents like CrowdStrike Falcon or FireEye run scheduled jobs (e.g., at 02:00 AM) to fetch and install the latest threat intelligence definitions. The installation of these definition modules involves writing new binaries to protected directories, which triggers the ProgramProtectorXPv10 rule as a “new program deployment.”
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for process names C-Setup.exe (CrowdStrike) or fehost.exe (FireEye). Filter events where the user context is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and the action occurs within a defined maintenance window (e.g., 01:00–04:00 UTC).

• Scenario: SCCM/Intune Application Deployment Push

  • Context: System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune pushes application updates to endpoints via the ccmsetup.exe