This detection identifies potentially malicious binaries that are pseudo-signed with a Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 debug version certificate, a technique often used by adversaries to evade signature-based defenses while maintaining a legitimate appearance. A SOC team should proactively hunt for this anomaly in Azure Sentinel because the use of outdated or non-production debug certificates is a strong indicator of supply chain compromise or custom malware designed to bypass standard trust mechanisms.
rule PseudoSigner01MicrosoftVisualC60DebugVersionAnorganix
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 55 8B EC 51 90 90 90 01 01 90 90 90 90 68 [4] 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 00 01 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 00 01 90 90 90 90 90 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the detection rule PseudoSigner01MicrosoftVisualC60DebugVersionAnorganix, along with suggested filters and exclusions:
Legacy Internal Build Server Execution
msvcp60.dll library compiled in Debug mode during the final packaging stage of an internal legacy application. The binary lacks a commercial code signature, triggering the “PseudoSigner” alert due to its debug version string and Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 origin.BuildServer-01) or exclude the full path of the internal build artifacts directory: \\FileShare\Legacy_Builds\Output\*.exe.Scheduled Database Maintenance Script
SQL_Maintenance_VB6 or filter by process parent: sqlagent.exe. Additionally, add a specific hash exclusion for the utility binary if its SHA-256 is known and static.Third-Party Legacy Reporting Tool Installation