This detection identifies potentially malicious executables that exhibit anomalous code signing characteristics, specifically those mimicking Microsoft Visual C++ 6.20 signatures with irregular signer metadata. Proactive hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is essential to uncover stealthy adversaries who leverage legitimate-looking compiler artifacts to bypass initial trust mechanisms and establish a foothold within the environment.
rule PseudoSigner01MicrosoftVisualC620Anorganix
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 90 90 90 90 68 [4] 67 64 FF 36 00 00 67 64 89 26 00 00 F1 90 90 90 90 55 8B EC 83 EC 50 53 56 57 BE 90 90 90 90 8D 7D F4 A5 A5 66 A5 8B }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the PseudoSigner01MicrosoftVisualC620Anorganix rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Engine Updates
ProcessName matches falcon.sys, SymantecEngine.exe, or ccSetPwd.exe AND the file extension is .dll or .sys.Scenario: Deployment of Internal Line-of-Business (LOB) Tools
OriginalFileName contains specific internal prefixes (e.g., LOB_, IT_Ops_) and the installation source path is within the standard corporate software distribution folder (e.g., C:\ProgramData\SCCM\Cache).Scenario: Automated Database Backup Jobs