This YARA rule targets the RCryptor ransomware variant, which encrypts files and appends the .vaska extension to extort victims. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify compromised endpoints or staging areas before the encryption process completes, minimizing potential data loss and operational disruption.
rule RCryptorv13bVaska
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 61 83 EF 4F 60 68 [4] FF D7 }
$a1 = { 61 83 EF 4F 60 68 [4] FF D7 B8 [4] 3D [4] 74 06 80 30 ?? 40 EB F3 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point or $a1 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.
RCryptor engine for on-the-fly file encryption during backup or migration tasks.
VeeamAgent.exe, CommCell.exe) or where the command line contains arguments related to backup/migration (e.g., /backup, /migrate, /encrypt).*EncryptConfig*, *SecureKeys*) or where the process path resides in a designated maintenance directory (e.g., C:\ProgramData\CorpTools\, C:\Scripts\Maintenance\).RCryptor library for unit testing or obfuscation of test artifacts.
svc-build, ci-agent) or where the working directory is within a known build workspace (e.g., C:\jenkins\workspace\, C:\azure-pipelines\).