This detection identifies the presence of the RCryptorV16dVaska ransomware variant by leveraging a specific YARA signature to catch early-stage infection indicators within endpoint processes. Proactively hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical because low-severity alerts often precede full-scale encryption events, allowing the SOC team to isolate compromised assets and initiate containment before data loss occurs.
rule RCryptorV16dVaska
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 60 90 61 61 80 7F F0 45 90 60 0F 85 1B 8B 1F FF 68 [4] B8 [4] 90 3D [4] 74 06 80 30 ?? 40 EB F3 B8 [4] 90 3D [4] 74 06 80 30 ?? 40 EB F3 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the RCryptorV16dVaska detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Microsoft Office Document Repair via Background Services
.docx or .xlsx file, OfficeClickToRun.exe (Microsoft Office Click-to-Run) often spawns a temporary process to repair the document structure. This involves reading and rewriting binary headers that mimic the encryption/decryption patterns of RCryptor ransomware.OfficeClickToRun.exe or WINWORD.EXE located in the standard installation path (C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office...). Additionally, filter out events where the file extension matches .docx, .xlsx, or .pptx.Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Database Updates
CbsService.exe (CrowdStrike), SentinelOneAgent.exe, or MsMpEng.exe. Apply a time-based filter to exclude alerts generated between 02:00 and 04:00 local time, coinciding with the standard update window.Scenario: Automated Backup and Deduplication Jobs