This detection identifies the presence of a specific YARA signature associated with the RLPack Full Edition software, which may indicate legitimate application deployment or potential supply chain compromise involving this library. A proactive hunt is recommended to validate whether these instances are authorized installations or unexpected artifacts that could serve as an initial foothold for adversaries leveraging known software components within the Azure Sentinel environment.
rule RLPackFullEdition117iBoxaPLibAp0x
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 60 E8 00 00 00 00 8B 2C 24 83 C4 04 [15] 8D B5 79 29 00 00 8D 9D 2C 03 00 00 33 FF [15] EB 0F FF 74 37 04 FF 34 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the RLPackFullEdition117iBoxaPLibAp0x detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via ESET Endpoint Protection
eset.exe or eset_service.exe process) downloads and unpacks signature definition packs. These packages frequently contain compressed libraries that match the “RLPack” structure identified by the YARA rule, triggering an alert when the installer extracts files to %ProgramData%\ESET\ESET Endpoint Security\.eset.exe and eset_service.exe where the command line contains keywords like “update”, “install”, or “unpack”. Alternatively, exclude file paths matching C:\ProgramData\ESET\*.Scenario: Deployment of Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus via SCCM/Intune
OfficeC2RClient.exe). This process extracts large XML and binary configuration packs that mimic the signature of the RLPack library structure, specifically when installing the “Full Edition” suite components.OfficeC2RClient.exe or setup.exe running under the user context SYSTEM or specific service accounts (e.g., NT SERVICE\Microsoft Office Click-to-Run Service).Scenario: Automated Backup and Archiving by Veeam Agent