This hypothesis posits that adversaries are executing specific file-based activities identified by the RomeoAlfa YARA signature to establish persistence or execute initial payloads within the environment. The SOC team should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to validate the low-severity alert’s context, ensuring that these subtle indicators do not represent early-stage reconnaissance or lateral movement attempts that could escalate if left uninvestigated.
rule RomeoAlfa
{
meta:
copyright = "2015 Novetta Solutions"
author = "Novetta Threat Research & Interdiction Group - trig@novetta.com"
Source = "fba0b8bdc1be44d100ac31b864830fcc9d056f1f5ab5486384e09bd088256dd0.file2.bin"
strings:
/*
68 C4 94 41 00 push offset a0_0_0_0 ; "0.0.0.0"
56 push esi ; wchar_t *
E8 1C B4 00 00 call _wcscpy
83 C6 28 add esi, 28h
83 C4 08 add esp, 8
81 FE E8 CD 41 00 cmp esi, offset unk_41CDE8
7C E7 jl short loc_4039DA
*/
$zeroIPLoader = {68 [4] 56 E8 [4] 83 C6 28 83 C4 08 81 FE [4] 7C E?}
// push esi
// mov esi, [esp+4+a1]
// test esi, esi
// jle short loc_403FEB
// push edi
// mov edi, ds:Sleep
// push 0EA60h ; dwMilliseconds
// call edi ; Sleep
// dec esi
// jnz short loc_403FE0
// pop edi
// pop esi
// retn
$sleeper = {5? 8B [3] 85 ?? 7E ?? 5? 8B 3D [4] 68 [4] FF ?? 4? 75 ?? 5? 5? C3 }
$xercesc = "xercesc"
condition:
($sleeper in ((pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_offset)..(pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_offset + pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_size))
or $zeroIPLoader in ((pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_offset)..(pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_offset + pe.sections[pe.section_index(".text")].raw_data_size)))
and not $xercesc
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 3 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the RomeoAlfa detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with targeted exclusion strategies:
Scenario: Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM/SCCM) Software Updates Deployment
ccmexec.exe) frequently executes scripts and drops temporary binaries into the C:\Windows\CCMCache directory to stage and install software updates. These activities often involve rapid file creation, registry modifications, and process spawning that mimic the behavior patterns detected by the RomeoAlfa YARA rule.ccmexec.exe AND the working directory contains \CCMCache\. Additionally, whitelist the specific hash of the SCCM client service binary to prevent detection on its child processes.Scenario: Scheduled Windows Defender Antivirus Real-Time Scanning
MsMpEng.exe (Windows Defender) performs deep scans that involve reading and decompressing large archives or scanning specific file extensions in real-time. The rule may trigger on the high-volume I/O operations and temporary file handling performed by the antivirus engine itself.ImageName equal to MsMpEng.exe. Furthermore, exclude events where the source IP is internal (e.g., 10.x.x.x or 192.168.x.x) and the destination port corresponds to standard AV update channels (ports 443/80 for telemetry).Scenario: Automated Backup Jobs via Veeam Backup & Replication
VeeamAgentService.exe or associated worker processes run nightly jobs that snapshot virtual machines and transfer data. This involves mounting ISO images, creating