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Rooter Identifying Strings

yara LOW Yara-Rules
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This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Yara-Rules →
Retrieved: 2026-06-29T11:00:01Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

This rule detects adversary behavior where attackers attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious payloads by leveraging unique identifying strings within the Rooter framework. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these signatures in Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage reconnaissance activities that may precede more severe compromise events, despite their current low severity classification.

YARA Rule

rule RooterStrings : Rooter Family
{
    meta:
        description = "Rooter Identifying Strings"
        author = "Seth Hardy"
        last_modified = "2014-07-10"
        
    strings:
        $group1 = "seed\x00"
        $group2 = "prot\x00"
        $group3 = "ownin\x00"
        $group4 = "feed0\x00"
        $group5 = "nown\x00"

    condition:
       3 of ($group*)
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

This rule contains 5 string patterns in its detection logic.

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Rooter Identifying Strings detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:

Original source: https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules/blob/main/malware/MALW_Rooter.yar