This rule detects adversary behavior where attackers attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious payloads by leveraging unique identifying strings within the Rooter framework. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these signatures in Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage reconnaissance activities that may precede more severe compromise events, despite their current low severity classification.
rule RooterStrings : Rooter Family
{
meta:
description = "Rooter Identifying Strings"
author = "Seth Hardy"
last_modified = "2014-07-10"
strings:
$group1 = "seed\x00"
$group2 = "prot\x00"
$group3 = "ownin\x00"
$group4 = "feed0\x00"
$group5 = "nown\x00"
condition:
3 of ($group*)
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 5 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Rooter Identifying Strings detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Endpoint Management Agent Updates
C:\Windows\Temp directory or modify registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE to verify root access and installation integrity, mimicking the behavior of a rooting tool.ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or IvantiAgentService.exe, specifically when the file path contains \Temp\ or the operation involves registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft.Automated Patch Management Scans
C:\ProgramData\...) to track the root cause of version mismatches.wuauserv.exe or the specific patch management executable, targeting paths within C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\.Database Backup and Integrity Checks