This hypothesis posits that adversaries are utilizing SafeNet family tools to establish persistent access or secure communications within the environment, potentially masking their activities under legitimate security software signatures. Proactively hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical because its low severity classification may cause these subtle indicators of compromise to be overlooked during routine monitoring, allowing attackers to maintain a foothold undetected.
rule SafeNet : Family
{
meta:
description = "SafeNet family"
condition:
SafeNetCode or SafeNetStrings
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the SafeNet Family detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with targeted filtering strategies:
Scenario: Automated HSM Key Rotation via Scheduled Task
LunaKeyRotation.exe running under the SYSTEM or a dedicated service account like svc-hsm-admin) executes to rotate encryption keys and update certificate chains on the HSM.Luna*, SafeNet*, or HSMAdmin* when executed from the specific directory path (e.g., C:\Program Files\Thales\Luna Client\bin) and triggered by the known service account.svchost.exe or TaskScheduler) with a task name containing “HSM” or “KeyRotation”.Scenario: Enterprise Software Licensing Validation
Sentinel License Manager service (sac.exe) performs a health check and license renewal handshake against the central license server.sac.exe, slm.exe, or lms.exe located in the standard SafeNet installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Common Files\SafeNet).