SentinelSuperProAutomaticProtectionv640Safenet

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies potential SafeNet Sentinel SuperPro endpoint protection activities that may indicate an adversary attempting to evade security controls or establish persistence through automated defense mechanisms. SOC teams should proactively hunt for these signals in Azure Sentinel to distinguish between legitimate software updates and anomalous behaviors where attackers mimic trusted security processes to mask malicious operations.

YARA Rule

rule SentinelSuperProAutomaticProtectionv640Safenet
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 68 [4] 6A 01 6A 00 FF 15 [4] A3 [4] FF 15 [4] 33 C9 3D B7 00 00 00 A1 [4] 0F 94 C1 85 C0 89 0D [4] 0F 85 [4] 55 56 C7 05 [4] 01 00 00 00 FF 15 [4] 01 05 [4] FF 15 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the SentinelSuperProAutomaticProtectionv640Safenet detection rule, along with recommended filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via WSUS

  • Context: The Windows Update Service (or a third-party WSUS server) automatically downloads and installs the latest SentinelOne/SafeNet definition updates during off-hours. This triggers the rule as it mimics an executable launch or file modification event associated with the protection engine.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a filter to exclude processes where ProcessName matches wuauserv.exe and the parent process is svchost.exe. Alternatively, add a time-based exclusion for the specific update window (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00 UTC) on all domain-joined endpoints.

• Scenario: Enterprise Backup Agent Scanning Protected Volumes

  • Context: The Veeam or Commvault backup agent performs a full scan of the C:\ProgramData\SentinelOne directory to archive security logs and configuration files. The rule detects this file access as a potential “protection engine modification” event, flagging it as an anomaly when the backup agent is simply reading/writing metadata.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude the specific process vbrservice.exe (Veeam) or commvault.exe from triggering alerts when accessing paths containing \SentinelOne\. Implement a path-based exclusion: Path contains "C:\ProgramData\SentinelOne" AND ProcessName IN ("vbrservice.exe", "commvault.exe").

• Scenario: Group Policy Software Deployment of SafeNet Client

  • Context: An IT administrator pushes the SafeNet Sentinel SuperPro client update to a specific OU (Organizational Unit) using