This hypothesis targets the presence of the SLVc0deProtector v06 malware variant, a known tool often used to protect malicious payloads or establish initial footholds in compromised environments. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to identify low-severity infections early, potentially uncovering stealthy persistence mechanisms or precursor activities before they escalate into more impactful adversary actions.
rule SLVc0deProtectorv06SLV
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E8 49 00 00 00 69 E8 49 00 00 00 95 E8 4F 00 00 00 68 E8 1F 00 00 00 49 E8 E9 FF FF FF 67 E8 1F 00 00 00 93 E8 31 00 00 00 78 E8 DD FF FF FF 38 E8 E3 FF FF FF 66 E8 0D 00 00 00 04 E8 E3 FF FF FF 70 E8 CB FF FF FF 69 E8 DD FF FF FF 58 E8 DD FF FF FF 69 E8 E3 FF FF FF 79 E8 BF FF FF FF 69 83 C4 40 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 81 ED 97 11 40 00 8D B5 EF 11 40 00 B9 FE 2D 00 00 8B FE AC F8 [6] 90 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are specific false positive scenarios for the YARA rule SLVc0deProtectorv06SLV (a known signature for the SLVc0deProtector packer/protector), along with suggested filters:
Scenario: Legacy Application Deployment via SCCM/MECM
C:\Program Files\LegacyApp\ directory on multiple endpoints via a System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) task sequence.C:\Program Files\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\ where the parent folder name matches known legacy application names (e.g., LegacyApp, OldERP, SpecializedTool) and the file hash has been previously whitelisted in the CMDB.Scenario: Scheduled Backup Job with Custom Wrapper
schtasks) and executes the packed binary from a network share or local admin folder (C:\Admin\Backups\).Task Scheduler (svchost.exe or taskschd.msi context) or if the file path contains C:\Admin\ or C:\Backup\ and the file extension is .exe with a known good hash associated with the backup tool.**Scenario: Development Team